No. 55

<The normal world as correlate to the normal human community and the conditional connection between body functions and normally ,or rather, abnormally differing experiences>[[1]](#footnote-1)

The world of the natural, naïve attitude, the **world of the immediate, simple perception and experience**, the world not only of my experience, but of the natural, simple world experience, of the common human experience. What does this mean? Are these sufficiently clear, characteristic designations? We have a first sensual space actuality originally constituted, - we, not only everyone for himself, but we all in conversation, and <in> the empathy mutually advising us. Thereby a **system of univocal experience** is designated; and each perception belonging into it, emerging within it has the pure perceptual character; the perceived object in its sensual category of properties bodily presents itself therein. The different perceptions of the same object thereby do not have the same “grade of perfection”; continuing in rows of perceptions, we possibly have the consciousness to bring the object to ever more perfect apprehension for us, to ever more clearly see, “what it actually is”. But these differences of perfection do not change that the object with its properties is given in all perceptions of the univocal perceptual connection, which we here call the “original”, or else the normal [perceptual connection]; it is just in some given from one side, in others from another side, in some with relation to the circumstances, in the others with relation to those; some circumstances are less favorable, like seeing in the darkness in contrast to seeing in bright daylight.

Then a certain mediacy lies within perception. The quality of colors, given in relative darkness or in relative light (but **[638]** not in “good daylight”), phenomenologically points to the **optimal way of givenness** of the same color in good light; the self-givenness of the color is not an ultimate one, it intentionally points to a *terminus ad quem*. But this is not an ultimate one. If the object is well illuminated, thus with a still better illumination something could come out which had not been seen previously. Furthermore: I can bring it closer, and there where I saw an even coloring, I now see an uneven one; new differences come out, etc., **idea** of an optimum of such a determination’s givenness, **for which I cannot gain anything else, but can only suffer a loss**. But it is an idea. And for the whole object? <It is> the extensive space appearance for the phantom, to be unitarily represented within a course of perception. But for the body and then for the material thing? Accordingly also the acquaintedness of a thing is an idea, and it leaves open infinities. The actually known thing is always just an “appearance” of a line and multiplicity of appearances, striving towards a goal.

Living within natural-normal experience, we get to know the normal world of things pertaining to the senses. The invisibilities, that which is not tactile, etc., lying within the perceptions, and together with that the indeterminacies determine themselves in determining and intentionally in advance indicated <perceptions>, that is, in the way of producing the fulfillment of predelineated courses of experience. The things become known to us; and if they are [known] in any respect, then we will have, also there where the corresponding relative and experientially known optimum is not realized, a conscious relation to the optimum within the “incomplete” way of givenness, being no longer vague, but determined, like, when we see an object being familiar to us, without actually touching it, “know”, how it would give itself being touched, or how, seen in bad illumination, it “actually” looks, which “true” color it has, or, if it is touched incompletely, in a merely rudimental way, “actually” is according to roughness or smoothness.

**Each objectivity, the sensual surrounding world, is given within this natural experience with relation to the organism** as a system of functioning “organs of sensation”. The thing is **[639]** seen: The eye is open, it has a direction of regard related to the object, the object is within the focus of regard or it is not within the focus of regard. The eye can, by my “freely moving” it, direct itself hither and thither, it can focus on this determinate object, this will be seen more perfectly thereby, etc. In any case, within seeing the eye is always the functioning organ in relation to the object, and it falls within the scope of my perception, and [it] is, like the whole organism, always present in it, itself being the object of its functioning organs, even if with certain limitations: One hand is touched by <the> other, the former is object, the latter [is] a functioning organ of sensation for <the>perception of this object; the hand touches an eye, or the foot [touches] the hand, the hand touches the eye; but certainly, the eye is not an object for the other eye, etc. These relations are also followed by me with relation to others and the experiences are completed within mutual experiencing, communicated through empathy.

But this originally given world, originally coming to cognizing through continuing experience, is not the correlate of all possible experiences. The system of experiences, whose correlate it is, is **sometimes broken by way of other experiences**: i.e., instead of a continuous harmony we now have discordancies at certain points, “contradictions” against something otherwise being univocal. A more concise description is needed here. I have my system of accordance of former experience, which is distinguished into partial systems of actual and possible experience, according to the organs of sensation. Whereas the stream of experience goes on in accordance in multiple or at least in one partial system, another partial system changes against the rule of belongingness. Within this partial system there is again a univocal objective grasping: as if the object was another one. But according to the unity demanded through connection of partial systems, this is not right; as the other senses say, it is not another one. An object being actual remains through lasting accordance, and also the organism. But everything else becomes dependent on this. But always the given and already “well known” true is a transitional appearance towards an idea: complete acquaintance is always open.

The conspicuous thing, called “my body” within the system of my experiences (of my original, not empathic [experiences]), experiences, how it comes out in this system, impacts, to which, if it functions as an organ of sensation as it usually does, abnormal perceptions connect themselves. We speak of the burning of one’s finger, as a consequence of which the tactile appearances of the same pathologically differ from the normal ones; the things now do not appear ”the way they are”, namely insofar this finger is a functioning organ. All normal appearances, those mediating towards the opt<imal> [ones], are absent here, and [are] replaced by abnormal ones. The other touching organs thereby still function about normally. Or the eye is suffering the loss of its “normal visual function” by way of a stroke or a sting (or the eye is dazzled due to looking into the sun), but the other one is still normal. Or both eyes are concerned, but the other senses are still normal; but the references towards the corresponding visual appearances are not fulfilled through seeing, other appearances have taken their place.[[2]](#footnote-2) In addition to that, whereas my organism functions abnormally, that of the other one may function normally; but the conditions for the mutual understanding are not broken (to which belongs a certain measure of normality of sensuality), and I can state: that it touches or sees the things the way they “actually” are, whereas I do not see or touch them thus. In general: Multiple experiences of dependency of the qualitative way of givenness of all things being sustained of the organism.

It can also happen that the normal experiential multiplicity of the system of the natural familiar and motivated experience is broken without my realizing any normal changes at my organism, or finding within experience the normal changes of appearance as results of influences which I saw developing within the normal experiential connection.[[3]](#footnote-3) But the **[641]** dependency of the qualitative How of the organism is already indeterminately obvious in an apperceptive way; and if I follow these relations in theoretical exploration, [if] I take the experiences of the others and draw my rational experiential conclusions, it becomes quite probable that the conditional connection between the functions of the organism and normally, or rather, abnormally experiences in dependency according to the rule on the not only external disposition, but also on the unknown inner structure of the organism, which needs to be explored experientially, the functioning of which as being an organ is subject to certain regulations.

**The actuality thus is at the basis, the intuitional and actual world of a system of normal experiences, being characterized within themselves as giving actuality immediately; and the abnormal experiences are related to that**, the experienced of which receives a relation to the objectivity of normal experience in its connection with normally experienced things: That which is experienced therein as sensual quality, <is>apperceived as quality of the thing (of the actual [thing] of normal experience). But this quality is not “actual” quality, but an abnormal appearance of the true quality, indicating itself together with it in this connection. The normal world with its normal qualities is the correlate to the normal human community (determined here through the normal organism) – but the normal organism is itself only something determining itself through normal experience. Thus normal experience is not **in itself** characterized through the relation to the “normal” organism: **An original experiential system is characterized in itself**, and its correlate is **characterized in itself**, so to say as **etalon for all positing of actualities**.

On the other hand it is a part of the system of normal experience, that necessarily functional dependencies can be brought to light between the organism, being the organism of the experiencing subject, and the things being experienced by it, and again between the causal physical relations (layers, relations and causalities determined by the layer) and the contents of the experiential mental processes, the physical appearances as aspects, the adumbrations, etc. Furthermore: The abnormal shows itself initially as a disruption of the harmony of experience; but as soon as the dependency of my physical thing appearances of the real relations between organism and thing emerge, these fit into the univocal grasping: index of normal givennesses.

The question is now, how about the subjectivity of the sensual quality in contrast to this, whereby the normal and the abnormal ones are equated. And does not the possible abnormality likewise concern the spatio-temporal qualities of form as the specific sensual qualities? Is this the place to distinguish between those two? And the other question: can the basis to go beyond the “naturally naïve” world-regard towards an exact-physical one lie within the relativism of all physical qualities, within the being relative of the same to a functioning (in every experience functioning) organism and to the difference of a normal and abnormal organism (according to its functions)?

The latter needs to be denied. If we conceive of a system of experience (of a subject or of a multiplicity of communicating <subjects>), in which the organisms <had> only normal properties, were grasped in constantly normal functions, then this would be the right Eldorado for the physician. He then would not have to shift anything to the physiologist. But how should he then have a reason to subjectivize the specific sensual qualities? Do we thus not have to say: **The physician is directed purely objectively**; that is, he takes the world given in univocal normal experience as actuality and is not interested <in> the way the sensual givennesses correspond to the functioning of the organism, not in the fact that a certain organism in certain circumstances is required in a certain constitution, in order that the subject of experience has the respective experiences, and now normal ones, now abnormal ones; instead he considers the given things as univocal actualities, and as that they are actualities to be verified and **[643]** to be determined intersubjectively. He also does not regard the organisms as organs exerting sensual functions, but as objects of normal experience. Thus he regards the organisms of others like other things, the way they show themselves to him as actualities (of course while his organs of sensation do function normally); and he considers his own organism likewise as a thing, i.e., as if it was not an organism, abstracting from its function as organism, that is, <the way> others would experience it who cannot mentally live it <as> organism. And he finds the things (also organisms as things) within a relativism of causality, changing in their sensual constitutions according to the circumstances. The physical determination is the substantial-causal one: the determination according to physical properties having for their part their unitary relation to “natural laws”.

Of course the fiction of a common physics which never <would>get to know the abnormality of the organism cannot be exerted, since indeed, while treating organisms as things, it would soon encounter the abnormal, would create it as well. But the part of an attempt to exert the fiction in fact does already show, that within the field of the physical **theme** the abnormal and the relatedness to an organism is not implied, and that he, <the physician>, has a closed theme as physical nature, if he cancels the abnormal. Of course this is not random. It belongs to the essence of the sense-giving from which nature emerges as unity of a univocal possible experience, that all abnormal and as that breaking harmony implies its own certain way of identifying something normal, something to be demonstrated in normal constitution, by way of the normally constituted organism.

The experience itself with the experiential sense genetically developed within it overcomes all relativisms; it overcomes them insofar as it also takes them into its sense. The physician does not need to clarify theoretically and phenomenologically the relativism. He consequently follows the experiential sense and consequently exerts the objective attitude. He has been given the world as being within experience in the form of the presumptive sense-giving which needs to be opened up, and [he] now operates with the “being” which is <accepted> by him as consequently being verified, and with the supposedly being, the objective illusion (physical illusion), which on the other hand as something subjective, as something belonging to the mental subject, even if not as “psychic state”, stands within **[644]** psycho-physical connection, and has its objectivity therein, which then is not a physical [objectivity]. His starting point is that everything being objectively true in the physical sense (of the in-itself) is only something identical of a necessary method to gain a truth in itself from the determinations of experience in their subjectivity. This presupposes that he regards a normal experiential world for healthy men, whether singly or in a community, as a norm. The physical truth is related to a universal experience of the community conceived of as being univocal, and an experiential world, that is, to an organism functioning normally, which itself presupposes itself as true actuality, etc. The physician does not need to worry about these issues.

1. Probably 1918. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Differences of continuous or passing disturbances within the function; continuous degeneration of the organ, or passing change of its normal function. **Locke’s** example: cooling down of one hand, relative warming of the other; **Hobbe’s** example: seeing double through squinting. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. I accept the system of accordance; that which is given therein, is the real. The discordantly given trait is nothing but an illusion. The abnormal thereby univocally follows according to certain pieces of content of the normal givenness; thus far something actual exists. The accordance creates itself through the experience that actually “due” to” the real change of the organ (noticed within the univocal experience) the abnormal eventuates. Every time I burn my finger I find, touching with it, the thing being different: it appears differently, the way of appearance is determined by this situation. The same unchanged property of the thing appears in one case thus, in an abnormal case otherwise; here we say at first: It appears the way it actually is not. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)